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Is Consciousness Transcendent? 
Comments on James Tartaglia’s Philosophy in a Meaningless Life: A 




In this paper, I will discuss James Tartaglia’s view on consciousness, as laid out in chapters 4 and 5 
of Philosophy in a Meaningless life. Chapter 4 is an excellent critique of physicalist accounts of 
consciousness. In chapter 5, Tartaglia develops an original and intriguing alternative: the 
‘transcendent hypothesis’, the view that both consciousness and the physical world it puts us in 
touch with are elements of a reality whose nature is entirely unknown. I will raise small concerns 
about the critique of physicalism. More broadly, I worry that there is a tension between chapter 4 
and chapter 5: it seems to me that if the arguments of chapter 5 succeed in demonstrating that 
consciousness is unknowable, then this undermines the anti-physicalist arguments of chapter 4. 
Finally, I will respond to Tartaglia’s rejection of more standard alternatives to physicalism.    
 
In general, analytic philosophy has less to say about the meaning of life than 
other philosophical traditions. Many analytic philosophers doubt that questions 
concerning ‘life’s meaning’ are themselves meaningful questions. Certainly the 
vast majority of analytic philosophers (and I put myself in this category) will 
feel that they can get on with their own little branch of philosophy – ethics, 
epistemology, philosophy of mind, or whatever – without relating it to questions 
pertaining to the meaning of life. In so far as the problem of life’s meaning is 
taken seriously, it is seen as an isolable philosophical issue that a philosopher 
may or may not be interested in. 
In this context, it is wonderful to find, in James Tartaglia’s Philosophy in a 
Meaningless Life, a return to true systematic philosophy. Three central topics of 
philosophy – consciousness, time, and universals – are dealt with through a 
single approach, an approach focusing on the meaning of life. Each chapter is 
rich and thought provoking, but in this essay I will focus on the two chapters of 
the book (4 and 5) that deal with consciousness. 
Chapter 4 is an excellent critique of physicalist accounts of consciousness. 
In chapter 5, Tartaglia develops and original and intriguing alternative: the 
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‘transcendent hypothesis’, the view that both consciousness and the physical 
world it puts us in touch with are elements of a reality whose nature is entirely 
unknown. I am broadly in agreement with the rejection of physicalism, but I will 
raise some responses to the argument of chapter 5 in support of the transcendent 
hypothesis. More broadly, I worry that there is a tension between chapter 4 and 
chapter 5: it seems to me that if the arguments of chapter 5 succeed in 
demonstrating that consciousness is unknowable, then this undermines the 
anti-physicalist arguments of chapter 4. Finally, I will suggest that Tartaglia 
presents a less than conclusive case against more conventional alternatives to 
physicalism, such as dualism and panpsychism, and that these might be better 
options for the anti-physicalist.  
 
Can physical science account for consciousness? 
 
Physicalism is the view that fundamental reality is entirely physical. There 
are broadly speaking two approaches the physicalist can take to consciousness: 
reductionism and eliminativism. The reductionist tries to account for 
consciousness in terms of physical processes in the brain. The eliminativist 
denies that consciousness exists, and in this way dispenses with the need to 
account for it.  
The latter option is not very popular. For most phenomena, you’ll find some 
philosopher willing to deny its existence: free will, moral value, the material 
world. But the reality of consciousness seems so evident, that few philosophers 
are prepared to embrace out and out eliminativism about it. What could be more 
evident than your present experience of colours, sounds, emotions, etc.? Perhaps 
because it has few adherents, the case against eliminativism is not well explored. 
Most are happy to take the reality of consciousness as a non-negotiable starting 
point.   
Tartaglia offers an extremely interesting argument against eliminativism, 
going beyond just pointing out its basic implausibility. In the case of 
eliminativism about other phenomena – free will, moral value, God, or whatever 
– the eliminativist is able to make sense of the rational basis for belief in the 
entity in question. The eliminativist about, say, free will, ultimately thinks that 
belief in free will is false, but she will have something to say about why people 
believe in free will, something that makes sense of how rational women and men 
could come to believe in such a thing. Many eliminativists would say that people 
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believe in free will because it sure feels like we make free decisions.  
In the case of eliminativism about consciousness, however, it’s hard to see 
what could be said. One cannot say (as one would probably want to say in the 
case of free will) that it feels as though we’re conscious, because of course to 
accept the reality of feelings just is to accept the reality of consciousness. It 
seems that the consciousness eliminativist will have to say that we just have a 
basic, ungrounded, disposition to claim that we have experiences, contrary to the 
reality. As Tartaglia puts it: 
 
… the enduring inclination is to judge that I am having a certain kind of 
experience. But if I am not, and there is nothing in the objective world 
that I could mistake for an experience, then this inclination can have no 
rational basis, and must rather be an automatic and senseless reaction. 
This, however, is not how it strikes us at all: it is not as though I 
inexplicably find myself wanting to spout the word ‘I’m having an 
experience’ without knowing why; as if believing we have experiences 
were like suffering from Tourette’s syndrome.’ (p. 94) 
 
This seems to me a powerful and ingenious way of strengthening the case 
against eliminativism.  
What about reductionism, the more popular form of physicalism? Tartaglia 
argues, quite powerfully in my view, that reductionism collapses into 
eliminativism, and so ends up being just as implausible. The problem is that our 
concepts of consciousness richly characterise it, and that that characterization is 
inconsistent with the characterization physicalists give of it. Physicalist U. T. 
Place argued that our concept of a green experience amounts to nothing more 
than ‘the sort of thing we have when we see something green.’ Such a minimal 
characterization leaves the metaphysical nature of the green experience 
completely open, and hence leaves it open that the green experience could turn 
out to be a brain state (which is exactly Place’s view).  
The problem is, as Tartaglia puts it, ‘our conception of conscious experience 
is not remotely this anodyne’ (p. 96). He argues that, contra Place, our ordinary 
mental concepts characterise green experience as having a green quality 
(‘although not ‘green’ in the same sense we use to describe a patch of light’). 
And more broadly, we have a rich understanding of what an experience is: it is a 
certain kind of self-aware state. These kinds of essentially subjective properties 
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have no place in the objective picture of the world we get from physical science. 
The reductionist has managed to account for ‘consciousness’ by re-defining it. 
It’s a bit like claiming to have proved the existence of God, by redefining ‘God’ 
as the physical world, and then claiming that the existence of the physical world 
entails the existence of God. 
The currently dominant form of physicalism – the so-called ‘phenomenal 
concept strategy’ – tries to avoid this difficulty by claiming that we refer to our 
conscious states directly, rather than in virtue of any of their properties. We think 
about ‘water’ in terms of its superficial characteristics, such as its being 
colourless and odourless, and its being the stuff that falls from the sky and fills 
oceans and lakes. But, according to the phenomenal concept strategy, we don’t 
think about our conscious experiences in terms of any of their characteristics; we 
simply have a capacity to, as it were, blindly point at them through 
introspection: pain is ‘that thing’ *points at introspectively*. If this is our 
relationship to pain – a kind of blind pointing – then there seems no way of 
ruling out that the thing we blindly point at turns out to be a physical brain state.  
Tartaglia’s reply is that to point blindly isn’t really to have a concept at all: 
 
[the phenomenal concept strategy] forgets what it means to have a concept 
of something. My concept of a tree is what I believe the tree to be: it is 
how I think of it. It is true that I can have a false conception of a tree and 
yet still manage to refer to it; just as I can refer to a man at a party as the 
one drinking a martini even if he is drinking water. However, even a false 
conception presents my conception of what the things is; the Phenomenal 
Concept Strategy cannot exempt introspective concepts of this basic 
requirement … (p. 98) 
 
I’m not so sure. In Naming and Necessity, Kripke claims that proper names refer 
in virtue of a causal connection between the name and the referent, rather than in 
virtue of an associated description. A school child can refer to ‘Galileo’ without 
knowing anything about him (perhaps they mistakenly think he was a famous 
explorer), which shows that they can’t be picking him out in terms of any of his 
characteristics. The child manages to pick out Galileo because they use a term, 
i.e. ‘Galileo’, which is causally connected in the right kind of way with Galileo 
himself. This account of proper names seems to me fairly plausible, and it 
suggests that the concept expressed by a proper name is a kind of blind pointer. 
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I think it’s better to say, not that there are no blind-pointer-type concepts, but 
simply that it’s pretty implausible that experiential concepts are 
blind-pointer-type concepts. When I think about pain in terms of how it feels, I 
know something about its essential nature. That’s what prompts my concern 
when others feel pain; I know what pain is, and hence I know it’s a terrible thing 
to endure. We might bolster this claim with reference to Tartaglia’s claim that we 
characterise experiences as self-aware states: to characterise a state as self-aware 
is to have a positive conception of it, not just to point blindly at it. 
However, these are finer points of dialectical strategy. I agree with Tartaglia 
that the physicalist can accommodate consciousness only by revising our 
ordinary concept of experience, pretending that those concepts are more 
minimal than they in fact are. And this means that, in terms of consciousness as 
we ordinary conceive of it, the physicalist is an eliminativist. And as Galen 
Strawson remarks (reported by Tartaglia), eliminativism about consciousness is 
‘the silliest view ever put forward.’ 
 
The Transcendent Hypothesis 
 
Tartaglia rejects not only physicalism, but also the standard alternatives to 
physicalism, such as dualism, panpsychism and idealism. I will get to his 
concerns about these views presently. But first I want to explore the line of 
reasoning that gets Tartaglia to his favoured position: the transcendent 
hypothesis. According to the transcendent hypothesis, ultimate reality transcends 
our understanding of it. Ultimate reality, for Tartaglia, contains consciousness, 
but not in a form that corresponds to human understanding of it. The 
transcendent form of consciousness is entirely unknown.  
The move towards the transcendent hypothesis begins with some reasons for 
thinking that our ordinary conception of consciousness is hopelessly flawed. As 
Tartaglia notes, it is a traditional view in modern Western philosophy that the 
mind is better known that the body, indeed that we have a perfect grip on the 
nature of our experiential properties. He argues, however, that upon reflection, 
our experiential concepts turn out to be mere ‘shadows’ of our concepts of 
properties in the material world. We seem to find in our experience shape-like 
properties: my experience of the tree in front of me seems to be tree-shaped. 
And yet ‘our only notion of spatial arrangement and shape belongs to the 
objective world. We have no other notion, and besides, this is evidently the 
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notion we have in mind; the shape we discern in the experience is the shape the 
tree has, just as a photograph of a tree has the shape the tree has’ (p. 110).  
What about the greenish quality I find in my experience of the tree’s leaves? 
Colour, as Tartaglia notes, has often been taken by philosophers to reside 
primarily in the mind rather than the physical world. But he then rejects this 
traditional view, with an argument reminiscent of Berkeley’s attacks on Locke: 
‘if experiences do not have a size and shape, they can hardly have a colour 
which fills that size and shape … the greenness I had in my mind filled the 
contours of my experiences; but since experiences can have no contours to be 
filled, this cannot be a property that experiences possess’ (p. 111). What 
philosophers think of as the properties of experience – ‘phenomenal shape’ and 
‘phenomenal colour’ – are so described using concepts borrowed from our 
concepts of features of the external world. We dress experience up in the clothes 
of external reality in order to make sense of our idea of it as an internal 
mirroring of that external reality. 
I remain unpersuaded. Phenomenal colour and phenomenal shape represent 
their external analogues: when I see a tomato I have an experience which 
represents a red, round thing at a certain distance from me. But I see no reason 
to doubt that there is ‘mental paint’ doing the representing, mental paint with an 
intrinsic character known through introspection. We call a certain intrinsic 
property of experience ‘phenomenal colour’ because it represents phenomenal 
colour, and another intrinsic property of experience ‘phenomenal shape’ because 
it represents phenomenal shape. But this fact is not inconsistent with their 
having an intrinsic character of their own known through introspection. I do not 
take myself to have given an argument for this view; my only claim is that I 
can’t see what reason Tartaglia has given us to doubt it. 
Tartagalia presses the Berkeleyen argument: 
 
… as Berkeley has pointed out, resemblance between ideas and physical 
objects makes no sense; and we might express this point by saying that if 
experience does not belong to the objective world, then an experience 
cannot resemble something objective in virtue of shape. We might try to 
get around this by talking of an abstract isomorphism rather than a 
resemblance, such that something about the nature of experience 
systematically correlates with the shape of the tree. But to say this is to 
admit that the notion of shape is inapplicable to experience, despite the 
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fact that when I attend to my experience, all I find is something shaped 
like a tree; the experience of the leaves is above the experience of the 
trunk and so on. (p. 110) 
 
Certainly there is something we find in experience that we feel inclined to 
describe in such spatial terms. But I still don’t see why I cannot say that that 
thing is an intrinsic phenomenal character – known in terms of its essential 
nature – and that it is external shape which is unknown – or rather known only 
in terms of its structural commonalities with phenomenal shape. On this view, it 
is our conception of external shape that is a mere ‘shadow’ of our conception of 
phenomenal shape, rather than vice versa. Again, I have not given an argument 
for the epistemic priority of phenomenal properties over external properties, but 
I cannot see that Tartaglia has given an argument for his converse prioritising of 
external properties over phenomenal properties. 
But what is this ‘phenomenal character’ that we know through introspection? 
Tartaglia complains that we can’t say much about it: 
 
If I want to tell you what the experience of green is, for instance, I have 
but three very inadequate options: I can compare it to another colour 
experience; tell you how to get it so you can find out for yourself; or say 
some very general, philosophical things, such as that it is a subjective 
state that alerts people to the presence of green light. None of this 
remotely compares to the detailed knowledge than can be imparted about 
things in the objective world (p. 107). 
 
It is a familiar point that experiential qualities are in some sense ineffable. But 
this is plausibly due to the fact that the concepts we use to pick them out are 
primitive. Compare to other plausibly primitive concepts: existence, 
metaphysical possibility, causation, the notion of a reason. It is arguable that 
none of these notions can be explained in more basic terms. If someone asks you 
what it is to have a reason to perform a certain action ɸ, you might say ‘It’s for it 
to be the case that something counts in favour of ɸing.’ But this is really just to 
use different words to express the same concept. There is nothing mysterious 
about this, we have just reached the basic epistemic building blocks of our 
picture of the world. If, as seems plausible to me, experiential concepts are also 
epistemically basic, then we should likewise take it that we can’t say much very 
 28
informative about the nature of a given experience. The nature is known, but it is 
known only through actually having the experience itself. If you have to ask, 
you’ll never know. 
Tartaglia goes on to argue that our conception of experience is not only 
inadequate, but flawed. This further argument goes as follows (p. 112): 
 
1. In order to make sense of experiences representing the external world, 
it is necessary to conceive of experiences as being causally determined 
by the environment. 
2. However, given that experiences are not part of the objective world, 
they cannot be causally impacted by features of the objective world. 
3. Therefore, the notion that experiences represent the external world is 
incoherent. 
 
The second premise seems to me to depend on equivocation concerning the 
word ‘objective.’ Experiences are not ‘objective’ in the sense that they are 
subjective properties, i.e. properties which characterise the subjective experience 
of an individual. But they are perfectly ‘objective’ in the sense that the facts 
about experience are perfectly objective facts about reality. If I am having a pain 
with a certain phenomenal character, then it is a fully real fact about the world 
that I am having a pain with that particular phenomenal character. If someone 
thinks I am not having that pain, then they are wrong. And if experiential 
properties are in this sense perfectly objective features of reality, then why 
should they not causally impact on the physical world? In the last section we 
saw reason to doubt that experience properties are physical; but just because a 
property is not physical it does not follow that it cannot causally impact on 
properties that are physical. The belief that a non-physical God impacts through 
miracles in the physical world, whether or not it is true, does not seem to be 
incoherent. 
I am therefore not persuaded that I have reason to abandon the traditional 
view, which seems to me quite plausible, that the nature of experiential 
properties is (more or less) perfectly known through introspection. And for this 
reason, although I find the transcendent hypothesis intriguing and worth further 




A tension between the two chapters 
 
In chapter 4 Tartaglia argues against physicalism on the grounds that we 
have a rich conception of consciousness and one at odds with the 
characterizations of consciousness offered by physicalists. In chapter 5, Tartaglia 
argues that we know absolutely nothing about the true nature of consciousness. 
This is most explicit at the point when his discussion touches on considerations 
pertaining to the famous ‘knowledge argument’ against physicalism. In the much 
discussed version formulated by Frank Jackson, the genius brain scientist Mary 
has spent all of her life in a black and white room, from where she has learnt 
everything there is to know about the physical processes involved in colour 
vision. One day she escapes her room and, for the first time, sees something red. 
For proponents of the knowledge argument, Mary at this point learns something 
new: what it’s like to see red. This is supposed to show that there is more to red 
experience than can be known from physical science. 
Tartaglia certainly wants to agree with the conclusion of the knowledge 
argument: red experiences are part of unknowable transcendent reality, and 
hence their nature cannot be known through physical science. But if red 
experiences are transcendent, then Mary’s experience of red cannot teach us 
anything about their nature either:  
 
… it is easy to be misled by the thought that in having experiences we 
learn something new, namely what it is like to have them. There is 
something important to this though, since there is no experience in the 
objective world … [h]owever … it is a mistake to infer ... that knowledge 
of ‘what it’s like’ is knowledge of a different part of reality than the 
objective world. These are mistakes because in having an experience, and 
making sense of it in the only way we can – namely with objective 
thought – we are forming a misconception. (p. 115-6) 
 
Why do I need to make sense of experience in terms of objective thought? Why 
can’t I form a perfectly adequate conception just by conceiving of my 
experience in terms of what it’s like to have it? It seems that I can entertain the 
possibility of solipsism – the hypothesis that all that exists is myself and my 
mental properties – and in doing so I think about my experience without 
bringing in the idea of anything from the external world. Why is this not a 
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perfectly adequate conception of my own experiences? I suspect there may 
again be an equivocation in talk of ‘objective’ thought and reality. The 
conception I form of myself and my experience when I entertain the epistemic 
possibility of solipsism is ‘subjective’ in the sense that it characterizes reality in 
terms of properties of subjective experience, but it is also perfectly ‘objective’ 
just in the sense that it is an objective fact about reality that I really am 
instantiating those subjective experiential properties. 
Moreover, if I have no adequate conception of my experiences, and hence 
know nothing about their nature, how can I know that their nature is not entirely 
physical? The anti-physicalist arguments of chapter 4 depended on my having 
rich knowledge of the nature of experience, which enabled me to rule out that 
my experiences are physical brain processes. But if I know absolutely nothing of 
the nature of my experiential properties, then these arguments seem to be 
undermined.  
Indeed, Tartaglia adopts a response to the knowledge argument popular 
among the phenomenal concept strategists, the very physicalists he argued 
against in chapter 5: 
 
… it is said that someone acquainted with objective thought’s final story 
about the nature of red, would upon seeing red for the first time learn what 
it is like to see red – which is not something they could have known 
before … [this is] best accounted for in terms of their acquisition of 
demonstrative concepts. Thus when they see red, they acquire a new 
demonstrative concept of it as ‘that’ property, the one they are indirectly 
aware of when they have a certain type of experience; as well as a shadow 
concept of ‘that’ as an experience of red. However although this will 
allow them to recognize red when they see it, and the experience of red 
when they have it, it will not teach them anything new about reality under 
either interpretation. (p. 116-7) 
 
According to many phenomenal concept strategists, the reason we can’t know a 
priori the conscious states are physical states is that our experiential concepts are 
demonstratives, and hence do not reveal to us the physical nature of their 
referents. It is an empirical fact that our experiential demonstratives pick out 
physical brain properties. Given that Tartaglia also thinks of experiential 
concepts as demonstratives that leave us in the dark about the nature of 
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experience, how can he be so confident that experience doesn’t have a purely 
physical nature? The arguments of the previous chapter depended upon our 
having a rich conception of experience, but the demonstrative account we find 
here seems to undermine that. 
 
What’s wrong with dualism and panpsychism? 
 
Tartaglia spends much more time rejecting physicalism than he does 
rejecting the traditional opponent of physicalism. There has been much 
discussion recently of Russellian monism, a view which has two components: 
 
1. Physics fails to reveal to us the intrinsic nature of matter, telling us only 
about its structural or dispositional properties 
2. The intrinsic nature of matter is made up of conscious, or 
proto-conscious, properties. 
 
Tartaglia’s quick rejection of this view is premised on understanding Russellian 
monism as in competition with physical science, a competition which the former 
looks certain to lose: 
 
… philosophers are in no position to pontificate on the inadequacy of our 
conception of matter; this is a concern which long ago passed into the 
hands of empirical science. And besides the inadvisability of philosophers 
stepping into core scientific territory as anything more than interested 
bystanders … the fact remains that in a contest between our ordinary 
conception of consciousness and objective thought, objective thought 
wins hands down. Objective thought provides the foundation for all of our 
understanding of the world, and cannot be put in doubt by a philosophical 
problem. (p. 99-100) 
 
However, Russellian monists do not see themselves as in competition with 
natural scientists, or trying to interfere with their work. The point is that, from 
Galileo onwards, natural scientists have been involved in a rather limited kind of 
project: mapping the causal structure of the universe. They have simply not been 
in the business of speculating about the intrinsic nature of matter. Philosophers 
should certainly leave it to physicists to tell us what the causal structure of 
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matter is. But they shouldn’t leave it to physicists to tell us its intrinsic nature, 
because this is simply not the job of a physicist.  
Russellian monists do not propose a competition between theorists of the 
objective physical world and theorists of consciousness; rather they propose a 
way of bringing both together in contributing towards a unified picture of reality. 
On this unified picture, consciousness is the intrinsic nature of the stuff physics 
describes extrinsically.   
Tartaglia is even quicker in his rejection of dualism. In order to make sense 
of the interaction between mind and the physical world ‘… the dualists must 
attribute to the brain a unique capacity to interact with the non-physical world’ 
(p. 102). But Tartaglia has already rejected any such ‘metaphysical specialness’ 
of the brain: ‘we know from objective thought the brain is not radically unlike 
everything else in the world; it is the most complex organ in the human body 
and the one science currently knows least about, but it is nevertheless still a 
physical object, metaphysically on a par with every other’ (p. 101-2).    
This is reminiscent of the standard anti-dualist argument from the alleged 
‘causal closure’ of the physical world. If the physical world is causally closed, 
then there is no space for the mind to do any causal work by making changes in 
the brain. However, although often stated, the causal closure of the physical is 
not often defended with empirical argument. It would be nice to hear a little bit 
more from Tartaglia of the case for causal closure.  
 
